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ICACT20220404 Question.1
Questioner: zhouzijiao995@163.com    2022-02-15 오후 11:45:24
ICACT20220404 Answer.1
Answer by Auhor ruigelwang@163.com   2022-02-15 오후 11:45:24
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You have mentioned 11 papers separately, but what is the exact development route and direction of Secure Boot Schemes for Embedded Devices? The hardware-based safe boot scheme for embedded devices will replace the pure software safe boot scheme for embedded devices, but the hardware-based safe safe boot scheme for embedded devices is often limited by many factors, such as volume, energy and so on. And generally, embedded systems are very diversified and lack of uniformity, which increases the difficulty of research on hardware-based secure startup mechanism.
ICACT20220404 Question.2
Questioner: tomayoon@ieee.org    2022-02-15 오후 11:50:12
ICACT20220404 Answer.2
Answer by Auhor ruigelwang@163.com   2022-02-15 오후 11:50:12
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First of all, thank you for the good research paper and presentation contents. I would like to know more about the research environment used in this study, and also in detail about the equipment & operating systems, development languages and software libraries you used. My paper is a review about existing secure boot schemes for embedded devices. The current research is mainly analyzed from a theoretical perspective, and the subsequent experimental comparative study of relevant methods will be carried out as the research goes further.
ICACT20220404 Question.3
Questioner: ktkim@etrir.re.kr    2022-02-15 오후 11:54:30
ICACT20220404 Answer.3
Answer by Auhor ruigelwang@163.com   2022-02-15 오후 11:54:30
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Comment on the TEE for the secure booting. It would be better to have below references. - Arm’s TrustZone technology offers an efficient, system-wide approach to security with hardware-enforced isolation built into the CPU. - MultiZone Security is the first trusted execution environment for RISC-V created by Hex Five Security. - The AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP), officially known as AMD Secure Technology, is a trusted execution environment subsystem incorporated into AMD microprocessors. - Apple uses a dedicated processor called SEP (Secure Enclave Processor) for features like data protection, Touch ID, and Face ID. The SEP is responsible for handling keys and other information such as biometrics that is sensitive enough to not be handled by the application processor. - Google also has a similar solution called Titan M, an external chip available on some Android Pixel devices to implement a TEE and handle features like secure boot, lock screen protection, disk encryption, etc. For small embedded devices, it is more feasible to design a secure boot scheme based on TPM.
ICACT20220404 Question.4
Questioner: namacabale@gmail.com    2022-02-16 오후 12:35:55
ICACT20220404 Answer.4
Answer by Auhor ruigelwang@163.com   2022-02-16 오후 12:35:55
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Dear Author, you have a very good research. which of the the schemes you surveyed have been deployed in real world environment? Thank you and stay safe. None of the research schemes reviewed in this paper has been applied in the real world at present, and some schemes have established prototype systems and are in the verification stage.
ICACT20220404 Question.5
Questioner: yanyonghang@henu.edu.cn    2022-02-16 오후 12:43:12
ICACT20220404 Answer.5
Answer by Auhor ruigelwang@163.com   2022-02-16 오후 12:43:12
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Aiming at small imbedded devices, what were the common disadvantages of existing research schemes? Small embedded devices are mostly small in size, weak in function and poor in scalability. Existing hardware-based solutions to security mechanisms require expensive chips and additional size and power support. The existing software-based security mechanism has the problem of lack of credibility.