Now 13300 visitors
Today:0 Yesterday:0
Total: 161372
216S 51P 5R
2026-10-21, Week 43 |
| Member Login |
| TACT Journal Homepage |
| Call for Paper |
| Committee |
| Find My Paper |
| Author Homepage |
| Statistics & History |
| Welcome Message |
| Paper Procedure |
| FAQ |
| Paper Archives |
| Outstanding Papers |
| Author Homepage |
| - Paper Procedure |
| - Journal Procedure |
| - Presentation Tips |
|
| Program & Proceedings |
| Program with Papers |
| Plenary Session |
| Tutorial Session |
|
| Presentation Platform |
| Hotel & Travel Info |
| About Korea |
| Accommodation |
| Transportation |
| VISA |
| Other Infomation |
|
| Photo Gallery |
| Scheduler Login |
| Seminar |
| Archives Login |
|
| Sponsors |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Save Q&A |
 |
* Edit or answer any Q&A by selecting Q&A number Hyper Link below + Write button (Save)
|
ICACT20250175 Question.1
Questioner: ammarnabil23050@gmail.com 2025-02-16 오후 11:39:58 |
ICACT20250175 Answer.1
Answer by Auhor 965491454@qq.com 2025-02-16 오후 11:39:58
Chrome  Click!! |
| You presented an analysis of different attack and defense strategies using the Nash equilibrium model. Could you elaborate on how the strategic costs associated with both attack and defense influence the choice of strategies in this game framework? Additionally, what challenges might arise when applying these strategies in real-world warfare scenarios? |
Thank you for your question. When the attack cost of attackers increases, conservative attackers are more inclined to not attack. Because conservative attackers have a lower probability of success in their attacks, they are no longer cost-effective when the cost increases. When the defense cost of defenders increases, the probability of advanced defenders defending decreases because defenders can benefit even if their defense fails. In practical applications, multi-stage dynamic games are more common. Currently, this study only focuses on static games and will be conducted in future research to meet practical application needs |
| |
