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After conducting the game tree, we can analyze and solve the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game. The changes in strategy selection probabilities for different types of attackers and defenders are shown in Figure 2. It is evident that the probabilities gradually converge over the iterations, ultimately stabilizing at the mixed-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which is shown in Table 6. The probability of the attacker selecting the jamming strategy increases in the order of adventurous, balanced, and conservative types. This is because the corresponding costs of these jamming strategies decrease progressively, making it more profitable for the conservative attackers to adopt their attack strategies under the given parameter settings. Regarding the defenders, the advanced defenders are more likely to choose the defensive strategy compared to the elementary defenders. Although they incur higher strategic costs, their greater probability of successful defense ensures that the benefits gained from successful defenses are sufficient to offset those costs.
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IEEE/ICACT20250175 Slide.17
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