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ICACT20220039 Slide.16        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
Herein, the definition of missing authentication and authorization, the formulation of the category that affects the assets and security protection levels, the design of threat models, the implementation of security strategies, and the implementation of test cases were presented. In the upcoming studies, some test items for confidentiality, integrity, availability, retransmission, and authentication will be introduced to verify whether the security specifications are satisfied. Confidentiality will be tested by accessing Near-RT RIC resources, transmitting data, and performing operations. Integrity will be tested by sending tampered data and wrong commands to the Near-RT RIC. Meanwhile, availability and replay will be determined by continuously accessing resources such as the Near-RT RIC, as well as observing whether it causes network delays or interruptions to ascertain whether the security of this indicator is fulfilled. The test of authenticity is to detect whether the pretender can successfully deceive the authorization verification to determine the function of the component.

ICACT20220039 Slide.15        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
In this study, a test item was designed to verify the existence of a certificate, and a test item was written to test whether the SMO authenticates the visitor. Not only were the pre-conditions, inputs, execution conditions, and expected results of the test project detailed in a list of points, but also a case model was established to concretely instantiate the execution steps of the test project. First, an SMO and a Near-RT RIC were deployed and connected to each other. Subsequently, based on the conditions introduced by the certificate authority, two scenarios were designed. In Case I, the Near-RT RIC tester who has not obtained the certificate attempts to access the SMO. In Case ii, the Near-RT RIC tester who obtained the certificate attempts to access the SMO. Using this test case will ensure that both parties can verify each other’s identity by verifying the certificate.

ICACT20220039 Slide.14        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
A detailed description of mutual authentication is shown in Figure 5. At the SMO, a keystore stores the private and public certificate of the SMO, whereas a truststore stores the public certificate of the Near-RT RIC. Meanwhile, at the Near-RT RIC, a keystore stores the private and public certificate of the Near-RT RIC, whereas a truststore stores the public key of the SMO. First, the SMO will send a “Hello” message to Near-RT RIC and request for Near-RT RIC resources. When the Near-RT RIC receives the “Hello” message, it will respond to the SMO with its public certificate (.crt) and return a “Hello”. The SMO will verify the Near-RT RIC public certificate in its truststore. If the certificate is verified as valid and belongs to the Near-RT RIC, then SMO will generate a session key and use the public key of the Near-RT RIC to perform encryption. The Near-RT RIC will receive the session key sent by the SMO and then use its private key to decrypt the encrypted session key. Subsequently, Near-RT RIC will return the session key to the SMO and requests for a public key certificate from the SMO. The SMO sends its public key certificate to the Near-RT RIC for verification. If it is verified that the public key is valid and belongs to SMO, then the Near-RT RIC will use SMO’s public key to encrypt the encrypted session key and return it to the SMO. When the SMO receives the encrypted session key sent by the Near-RT RIC, the SMO uses its private key to decrypt the encrypted session key, thereby completing the mutual authentication process.

ICACT20220039 Slide.13        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
This study focuses on the security strategy required before an attack occurs and introduces the public key infrastructure architecture, which is composed of three main components: the certificate authority, registration authority, and certificate repository. Among them, the certificate authority is a trusted third party and is responsible for verifying the legitimacy of the public key in the public key system. First, the SMO and Near-RT RIC must register with the registration authority; subsequently, the registration authority will confirm the identities of the SMO and Near-RT RIC. After the confirmation is completed, the certificate authority signs the digital certificate to prove the authenticity of the public key, and then believes that the public key signed by it is valid and belongs to the SMO and Near-RT RIC; subsequently, it stores the public key in the certificate repository. Next, the certificate authority will issue a certificate to the applied SMO or Near-RT RIC. Finally, the two nodes possessing the certificate will conduct a two-way verification before commencing communication. The implementation framework is shown in Figure 4.

ICACT20220039 Slide.12        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
The content of the threat model includes the threat description, threat agent, method for identifying the threat, threatened assets, and components that affect the threatened assets. This study focuses on the threat model designed for missing authentication and authorization, as shown in Table 3. When the threat has not yet occurred, the SMO and Near-RT RIC access each other’s resources or perform operations through the O1 interface. The SMO must perform authentication verifications in advance and validate the identity before authorizing the device for operation. Cyber-criminals, insiders, hacktivists, cyber-terrorists, script kiddies, and the nation state are possible because no authentication record exists, and no inspection services or structures to perform authentication are introduced in advance; as such, the attack occurs when the SMO cannot prove the nature of both parties. This threatens assets such as data or instructions transmitted through the O1 interface, and directly affects components such as the SMO and Near-RT RIC.

ICACT20220039 Slide.11        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
This threat exists in two modes, i.e., “at rest” and “in transit,” and the security indicators that will be affected in both modes include confidentiality, integrity, and availability. If a person pretends to be an SMO or Near-RT RIC to access resources or after obtaining the resources, he intentionally or unintentionally reveals the content of the data that cause confidential data leakage; hence, the confidentiality of the security indicator will not be preserved. In addition, when an attacker pretends to be an SMO or a Near-RT RIC and tampers with the data that the component is preparing to transmit, the component will receive the wrong data. Consequently, the subsequent processing will be affected, and the integrity of the safety indicators will be compromised. However, a replay attack will cause network service delays and interrupt network services, thereby violating the availability of the security indicators. In the transit mode, the replay and authenticity will be additionally affected. When an attacker pretends to be an SMO or Near-RT RIC, constantly accesses component resources, or delays the transmission of data and hence delays the network service, the replay principle of the security indicators may be violated. In addition, if the other party does not verify the identity of another party before mutually accessing resources, transmitting data, and executing instructions, then the other party accessing resources or transmitting data may be counterfeited by a third party, which may violate the authenticity of the security indicators. The affected assets are shown in Figure 1 and Table 2.

ICACT20220039 Slide.10        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
Non-RT RICs are located within the SMO The function of Non rt time takes 1 second or more as a cycle The main purpose is to achieve intelligent optimization of RAN The machine functions include these analyses set by the Policy and provide rich information of the RAN, but the training model data of O1 (the real data of the knowledge used can provide rich information), which can also be called EI.

ICACT20220039 Slide.09        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
First Mainly to provide management services for RAN components Management interface and content There are four interfaces: O2, O1, A1, OFH M-Plane O1 is responsible for FCAPS management (FCAPS is an acronym for the five basic functions of network management) O2 is responsible for resource and load management of O-Cloud A1 is responsible for RAN optimization OFH M-Plane manages O-RU in a hybrid model

ICACT20220039 Slide.08        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
This vulnerability will expose components such as Near-RT RIC, Non-RT RIC, CU, DU, and SMO to threats Later I will introduce the SMO and Near rt ric nodes in ORAN in the following slides

ICACT20220039 Slide.07        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
The security vulnerability of missing authentication and authorization is defined and explained herein. Authentication is the process of determining whether an SMO or Near-RT RIC can transmit data, access the other party’s resources, or perform operations based on the component’s permissions and any permissions applicable to the resource or other access control specifications. Authorization verification is performed by the SMO responsible for the fault, configuration, accounting, performance, and security management. When the SMO or Near-RT RIC is required to transmit data, access the other party’s resources, or perform operations through the O1 interface, authorization is necessitated. If the SMO does not perform authorization verification, the threat or attacker can directly pretend to be an SMO or a Near-RT RIC to transmit data, access resources, or perform operations that are prohibited.

ICACT20220039 Slide.06        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
We‘ll focus on the threat marked on this flow . That is authentication and authorization 。

ICACT20220039 Slide.05        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
Here shows an illustration of the proposed case study, which includes vulnerability, exposed assets, threat model, security strategy and test case modules. The vulnerability module identifies the various vulnerabilities of the O-RAN communication network, which includes authentication, authorization, ciphering, integrity, replay, key reuse, implementation, and validate inputs. The exposed assets module identifies the assets and equipment exposed in the O-RAN network environment, including A1, E2, O1, Near-RT RIC, Non-RT RIC, O-CU, O-CU-CP, O-CU- UP, O-DU, O-RU, and RAN. The threat model is a security model based on vulnerabilities that can be used as a reference by stakeholders. Its content includes the threat description, threat agent, threat identifiers, and threat-asset-affected components. The security strategy is a vulnerability response strategy that can be used as a reference for strengthening system security and solving threats. It contains identity, credential, access management, network domain security, IPSec, and datagram transport layer security. The test case module verifies whether the solutions proposed by the security strategy effectively avoid threats. It includes security compliance testing, vulnerability testing, grey testing, and white-box testing.

ICACT20220039 Slide.04        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
In an O-RAN network environment involving multiple security protection mechanisms, failure to verify or revise various vulnerabilities will result in threats and challenges to the network environment. Attackers can use various attack methods to attack and expose the system to threats. These organizations or individuals, who intend to exploit the vulnerabilities or trigger the vulnerabilities and methods, are known as threat agents. Threat actors in the O-RAN environment include cyber-criminals, insiders, hacktivists, cyber-terrorists, script kiddies, and the nation state. This study focuses on the vulnerability and security of the O-RAN interface.

ICACT20220039 Slide.03        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
Owing to the rapid development of networks and their gradual evolution from a closed architecture to an open architecture, the open radio access network (O-RAN) has been developed and offers new possibilities. However, because the O-RAN contains many new open interfaces, new information security issues may emerge. In this study, information security is discussed and a case analysis is performed based on vulnerability, exposed assets, threat models, security strategies, and test case modules. Missing authentication and authorization vulnerabilities are emphasized in this study. Affected assets such as O-RAN’s Service Management and Orchestration(SMO), Near-RT RIC, and the O1 interface are discussed, and the threat model and security solution strategy are analyzed. Test cases are implemented to verify the effectiveness of the solution strategy. It is envisioned that the case analysis and development of missing authentication and authorization performed in this study will aid future mobile communication operators in addressing information security issues.

ICACT20220039 Slide.02        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
Abstract Introduction Security Threat Analysis and Treatment Strategy System Architecture Missing Authentication and Authorization Affected Asset Assets’ Protection Level Threat Model The O-RAN based architecture of adding Public Key Infrastructure The flow of mutual authentication Test case confirming the authentication on each node

ICACT20220039 Slide.01        [Big slide for presentation]       [YouTube] Chrome Text-to-Speach Click!!
our topic is Security threat analysis and threatment strategy for oran And my name is Chih Ting Shen