

A Novel Mutual Authentication Scheme for Session Initiation Protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography

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Abstract— The session initiation protocol (SIP) is the most widely used signaling protocol for controlling communication on the internet, establishing, maintaining, and terminating the sessions. The services that are enabled by SIP are equally applicable in the world of wireless communication. Recently, Tsai proposed an efficient nonce-based authentication scheme for SIP. In this paper, we do a cryptanalysis of Tsai's scheme and show that Tsai's scheme is vulnerable to the password guessing attack and stolen-verifier attack. Furthermore, Tsai's scheme does not provide known-key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy. We also propose a novel and secure mutual authentication scheme based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem for SIP which is immune to the presented attacks.

Keywords— Authentication, Elliptic curve cryptosystem, Security, Session initiation protocol.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [1] is one of the most important protocol that support multimedia services on both wired as well as wireless networks. SIP is an application layer control (signaling) protocol that can create, modify and terminate sessions with one or more participants. These sessions include multimedia distribution, internet telephone calls and internet multimedia conferences. Session members can communicate via a mesh of unicast relations or via multicast or a combination of these. Authentication is the most important aspect for SIP. When a user wants to access a SIP server in order to get various services from the remote server, he/she has to perform an authentication process. Therefore, the security of SIP is becoming more important which calls for robust authentication scheme. The original authentication scheme for SIP does not provide strong security, as it is derived from HTTP digest authentication [2] and has been proven to be insecure [8].

Recently, various SIP authentication schemes were proposed to provide strong security for SIP [2]-[8]. In the basic authentication scheme adopted in SIP, the SIP server uses challenge-response mechanism to verify the identity of the user only. In 2005, Yang et al. [8] pointed out that the procedure of the original SIP authentication scheme based on HTTP digest authentication is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack and server spoofing attack. In order to

overcome these flaws, Yang et al. proposed a secure authentication scheme for SIP. This authentication scheme is based on Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange [9], which depends on the difficulty of discrete logarithms. The computational cost of Yang et al.'s authentication scheme is very high, so it is not suitable for platforms offering low computational power. In order to improve this limitation, Durlanik et al. [10] proposed an authentication scheme using elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange algorithm in 2005. Later in 2009, Tsai [11] proposed an efficient nonce-based authentication scheme. Since all the communication messages are encrypted/ decrypted by using one-way hash function and XOR operation, so its computation cost is low, making it suitable for low-power processors.

Notwithstanding suitability of Tsai's scheme for low power processors, Tsai's scheme is still vulnerable to offline password guessing attack and stolen-verifier attack while it does not provide known-key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy [12]. This paper demonstrates the vulnerability of Tsai's authentication scheme to the above attacks, and then proposes a secure and efficient authentication based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) for SIP in order to overcome such security flaws.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces about the elliptic curve cryptography and secure one-way hash function. Section 3 gives the review of the Tsai's authentication scheme. Section 4 discusses the cryptanalysis of Tsai's authentication scheme. In section 5, an efficient and secure mutual authentication scheme of SIP is proposed. We analyse the security and efficiency of our proposed scheme in sections 6 and 7. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 8.

II. PRELIMINARIES

This section introduces about elliptic curve cryptography and secure one-way hash function.

A. Elliptic curve cryptography

Let $p > 3$ be a large prime number. An elliptic curve E over F_p is the set of all solutions $(x, y) \in F_p * F_p$ to an equation $E: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \mod p$, where

$a, b \in F_p$ and $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0 \pmod p$, together with a special point O called the point at infinity. It is well known that E is an (additively written) abelian group with the point O serving as its identity element. Choose a generator point $P = (x_P, y_P)$ over $E(F_p)$, where $P \neq O$. In such a way, a subgroup G of the elliptic curve group $E(F_p)$ is constructed. To guard against small subgroup attacks, the point P should be of a prime order n or equivalently, $nP = O$, and we should have $n > 4\sqrt{p}$. To protect against other known attacks on special classes of elliptic curves [13], n should not divide $p^i - 1$ for all $1 \leq i \leq V$ ($V = 20$ suffices in practice), $n \neq p$ should be satisfied, and the curve should be non-super singular. To retain the intractability of ECDLP, n should at least satisfy $n > 2^{160}$. Let us consider three related mathematical problems in G ; the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), the Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (ECCDHP) and the Elliptic Curve Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (ECDDHP).

- **ECDLP:** Given a point element Q in G , find an integer $x \in Z_q^*$ such that $Q = xP$, where xP indicates that the point P is added to itself for x times by the elliptic curves operation.
- **ECCDHP:** For $a, b \in Z_q^*$, given any two point elements aP, bP in G , compute abP in G .
- **ECDDHP:** For $a, b, c \in Z_q^*$, given any three point elements aP, bP and cP in G , decide whether $cP = abP$.

Clearly, we have the relationship that the ECCDHP is no harder than ECDLP, and ECDDHP is also no harder than ECCDHP in G . Therefore, we assume that ECDDHP is intractable ($E: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod p$ is a non-super singular elliptic curve), which may guarantee that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve ECDDHP, ECCDHP and ECDLP with non negligible probability.

B. One-way hash function

A one-way hash function H is said to be secure, if it satisfies the following properties [14].

- Given x , it is easy to compute $H(x) = y$. However, when given y , it is hard to compute $H^{-1}(y) = x$.
- Given x , it is computationally infeasible to find $x' \neq x$ such that $H(x') = H(x)$.

III. REVIEW OF TSAI'S AUTHENTICATION SCHEME FOR SIP

In this section, we briefly review Tsai's nonce-based authentication scheme for SIP [11]. There are two phases in Tsai's scheme: registration and authentication. Notations used in this paper are defined in Table 1.

TABLE 1. NOTATIONS

U	The client user
S	The server
D	A uniformly distributed dictionary of size $ D = 2^k$, where $40 \leq k \leq 105$
PW	A low-entropy password of U extracted from D
K_S	A high-entropy secret key of S , which is only known by the server and must be safeguarded.
SK	A shared common session key between U and S
G, P	Subgroup of the elliptic curve group $E(F_p)$ and its generator point of order q .
h	Secure one-way hash function, where $h: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$ and $l = 160$
$\oplus$	A bit-wise XOR operation
$\parallel$	A concatenation operation

A. Registration phase

When U wants to register and become a new legal user, U and S execute the following steps:

Step 1: $U \rightarrow S: \{\text{username}, PW\}$

U submits his/her username and PW to S .

Step 2: S stores U 's username and PW in the user account database.

B. Authentication phase

If a legal user U wants to login into the system, he/she must type his/her username and PW . All steps of authentication phase are then executed as follows:

Step 1: $U \rightarrow S: \text{REQUEST}(\text{username}, N_C)$

U generates a random number N_C and then sends it with a request message as REQUEST (username, N_C) to S .

Step 2: $S \rightarrow U: \text{CHALLENGE}(\text{realm}, N_S \oplus h(PW \parallel N_C), h(PW \parallel N_S \parallel N_C))$

When S receives the request message, S generates a random nonce N_S . Then, S uses N_S , N_C and PW to compute $N_S \oplus h(PW \parallel N_C)$ and $h(PW \parallel N_S \parallel N_C)$. Finally, S sends a challenge message CHALLENGE (realm, $N_S \oplus h(PW \parallel N_C)$, $h(PW \parallel N_S \parallel N_C)$) to U .

Step 3: $U \rightarrow S: \text{RESPONSE}(\text{username}, \text{realm}, h(\text{username}, \text{realm}, h(N_S \parallel PW \parallel N_C)))$

When U receives the challenge message, U uses N_C , PW to compute $h(PW \parallel N_C)$ and derives N_S by computing $N_S \oplus h(PW \parallel N_C) \oplus h(PW \parallel N_C)$. Then, U computes $h(PW \parallel N_S \parallel N_C)$ and verifies that whether it is equal to the received challenge $h(PW \parallel N_S \parallel N_C)$. If the two are not equal, U rejects the server challenge message. Otherwise,

U authenticates S and computes two hash values $h(N_S \parallel PW \parallel N_C)$ and $h(\text{username, realm, } h(N_S \parallel PW \parallel N_C))$. Finally, U sends a response message RESPONSE (username , realm, $h(\text{username, realm, } h(N_S \parallel PW \parallel N_C))$) to S .

Step 4: When S receives response message, S uses N_S, N_C, PW to compute $h(N_S \parallel PW \parallel N_C)$. If the computed $h(N_S \parallel PW \parallel N_C)$ is not the same as response $h(N_S \parallel PW \parallel N_C)$, then S rejects the user request. Otherwise, S accepts the connection.

After mutual authentication between S and U , $SK = N_S$ is used as a session key.

IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF TSAI'S AUTHENTICATION SCHEME FOR SIP

In this section, we show that Tsai's authentication scheme is vulnerable to password guessing attack, stolen-verifier attack and does not provide perfect forward secrecy and known-key secrecy.

A. Password guessing attack

In password guessing attack, an adversary intercepts authentication messages and stores them locally and then attempts to use a guessed password to verify the correctness of his/her guessing using these authentication messages[15]-[16]. In Tsai's authentication scheme, an adversary can intercept $N_C, N_S \oplus h(PW \parallel N_C)$ and $h(PW \parallel N_S \parallel N_C)$. Then, the adversary can guess a password PW^* and computes $h(PW^* \parallel N_C)$. He/she derives N_S from $N_S \oplus h(PW \parallel N_C)$. Then, he/she computes $h(PW^* \parallel N_S \parallel N_C)$. If it is equal to $h(PW \parallel N_S \parallel N_C)$, then the guessed password PW^* is correct. Otherwise, the adversary repeatedly guesses a new password PW^* . Thus, Tsai's authentication scheme is vulnerable to password guessing attacks.

B. Stolen-verifier attack

In most existing password based authentication schemes, servers are always the prime targets of the adversaries, because the users' verifiers (e.g. passwords) are stored in server's database. In stolen-verifier attack [17], an adversary who steals a password-verifier from the server can use it directly to impersonate a legitimate user in a user authentication execution. In fact, an adversary who obtains password-verifier may further mount a guessing attack.

In Tsai's authentication scheme, the plaintext password PW of the user is stored in the server, can be eavesdropped and then used to masquerade as the original user. Tsai did not explain the stolen-verifier attack, with regard to obtaining the user's secret data PW , which is stored in the server. By obtaining user's secret data PW , an illegitimate user can login to the server as a legitimate user. Suppose an adversary has stolen the user's secret data PW from the server. Then,

adversary can choose a random nonce N_E and sends it with a request message as REQUEST (username , N_E) to S in step 1 of authentication phase. Then, S will send a challenge message CHALLENGE (realm, $N_S \oplus h(PW \parallel N_E)$, $h(PW \parallel N_S \parallel N_E)$) to adversary. Then, adversary can make a valid response message RESPONSE (username , realm, $h(\text{username, realm, } h(N_S \parallel PW \parallel N_E))$) and sends it as a response message to S . As a result, S will authenticate adversary as a legal user U and accepts the user's login request. Therefore, the adversary can easily impersonate the legal user U . In addition, adversary can also impersonate the legal server by using the stolen user's secret password PW . Therefore, Tsai's authentication scheme is insecure against stolen-verifier attack.

C. Known-key secrecy

The known-key secrecy means the compromise of a past session key can't derive any other session keys or long term private key (e.g., U 's password PW or S private key K_S). The compromise of session key enables the protocol to be compromised.

In Tsai's authentication scheme, suppose an adversary has a session key $SK = N_S$ of the protocol. Then, by using $SK = N_S$, the adversary computes $h(PW \parallel N_C)$ because of $N_S \oplus h(PW \parallel N_C) \oplus SK$. Since N_C is the open nonce value and PW included in $h(PW \parallel N_C)$ is also known to adversary by performing password guessing attack. That is, adversary makes a guess at the secret password PW^* from the dictionary D and checks if $h(PW \parallel N_S) = h(PW^* \parallel N_C)$. If it holds, the adversary has guessed the correct password $PW^* = PW$. Compromise of user password PW will enable the adversary to impersonate S or U freely. Therefore, Tsai's authentication scheme cannot achieve known-key secrecy.

D. Perfect forward secrecy

The important security requirement for strong protocol evaluation is the perfect forward secrecy. A protocol with perfect forward secrecy ensures that even if one entity's long-term key is compromised, it will never reveal any session keys used previously [18]-[19]. It is easily seen that Tsai's authentication scheme cannot achieve the perfect forward secrecy. When a user's password PW is compromised, all the session keys $SK = N_S$ will also be opened and hence previous communication messages will be learnt.

In Tsai's authentication scheme, suppose an adversary obtains the password PW from the compromised user and N_C is also known because adversary can intercept it from the public channel. After that, adversary can compute the session key $SK = N_S$ from $N_S \oplus h(PW \parallel N_C)$ because of the $N_S \oplus h(PW \parallel N_C) \oplus h(PW \parallel N_C)$. Thus, if we know

PW and N_C then any old short term session keys are compromised. Therefore, Tsai's authentication scheme cannot achieve the perfect forward secrecy.

V. PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION SCHEME FOR SIP

In this section, we propose our novel mutual authentication scheme for session initiation protocol. The proposed scheme will consist of two phases: the registration phase and the authentication phase. Description of each phase is as follows:

A. Registration phase

When U wants to register and become a new legal user, U and S execute the following steps over a secure channel.

Step 1: $U \rightarrow S : \{ \text{username}, PW \}$

U submit his/her username and PW to S . S computes two secret values HPW and HK_S by using hash of U 's username, PW and K_S where $HPW = h(\text{username} || PW)$, $HK_S = h(\text{username} || K_S)$.

Step 2: S computes the password verifier $VPW = HPW \oplus HK_S$ for U .

Step 3: S stores U 's username and VPW in the user account database.

B. Authentication Phase

If a legal user wants to login into S , he/she must type his/her username and PW . All steps of authentication phase executed as follows.

Step 1: $U \rightarrow S : \text{REQUEST}(\text{username}, R_1)$

U generates a random integer $r_1 \in Z_q^*$. U computes $HPW = h(\text{username} || PW)$ from username and PW respectively. Then, U computes $R_1 = (HPW \cdot r_1)P$ and sends it with a request message as $\text{REQUEST}(\text{username}, R_1)$ to S .

Step 2: $S \rightarrow U : \text{CHALLENGE}(\text{realm}, R_2, h_1)$

Upon receiving the request message, S extracts HPW from VPW by computing $HK_S = h(\text{username} || K_S)$ and $HPW = VPW \oplus HK_S$, where VPW is a stored password verifier for U in the user account database. Then, S computes $R'_1 = HPW^{-1} R_1 = (HPW^{-1} \cdot HPW \cdot r_1)P = r_1P$. Now, S generates another random integer $r_2 \in Z_q^*$ and computes $R_2 = r_2P$, $SK_S = r_2 R'_1 = r_1 r_2 P$ and $h_1 = h(SK_S || R_2)$, where SK_S is the secret session key. Finally, S sends a challenge message $\text{CHALLENGE}(\text{realm}, R_2, h_1)$ to U .

Step 3: $U \rightarrow S : \text{RESPONSE}(\text{username}, \text{realm}, h(\text{username} || \text{realm} || SK_U))$

Upon receiving the challenge message, U computes a secret session key $SK_U = r_1 R_2 = r_1 r_2 P$ and checks

that $h(SK_U || R_2) = h_1$. If these are not equal, U rejects the server challenge message. Otherwise, U authenticates S and computes a message authentication code $h(\text{username} || \text{realm} || SK_U)$. Finally, U sends a response message $\text{RESPONSE}(\text{username}, \text{realm}, h(\text{username} || \text{realm} || SK_U))$ to S .

Step 4: Upon receiving the response message, S computes $h(\text{username} || \text{realm} || SK_S)$ and verifies whether it is equal to the received response $h(\text{username} || \text{realm} || SK_U)$. If they are not equal, S rejects the user response message. Otherwise, S authenticates U and accepts the user's login request.

After mutual authentication between U and S , $SK = SK_U = SK_S = r_1 r_2 P$ is used as a shared session key.

VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS

In this section, we examine the security of our proposed authentication scheme in terms of the following security properties: replay attack, password guessing attack, modification attack, stolen-verifier attack, server spoofing attack, known-key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy.

A. Replay attack

In our proposed scheme, nonce variables r_1 and r_2 are generated independently and both will be different in each login message. Suppose, an adversary intercepts $\text{REQUEST}(\text{username}, R_1)$ in Step 1 of authentication phase and replays it to impersonate U to login into S . However, adversary cannot compute a correct session key SK and deliver it to S in step 3 of authentication phase unless he/she correctly guesses password PW to obtain r_1P and guesses the right r_2 from $R_2 = r_2P$. When an adversary tries to guess r_1 from r_1P and r_2 from $R_2 = r_2P$, he/she will face ECDLP. On the other hand, suppose an adversary intercepts $\text{CHALLENGE}(\text{realm}, R_2, h_1)$ from S in step 2 of the authentication phase and replays it to impersonate S . For the same reason, if an adversary cannot gain the correct r_1 from r_1P , U will find out that h_1 is not equivalent to his/her computed $h(SK_U || R_2)$. Then, U will not send $\text{RESPONSE}(\text{username}, \text{realm}, h(\text{username} || \text{realm} || SK_U))$ back to adversary in step 3 of authentication phase. Therefore, our proposed authentication scheme can resist the replay attack.

B. Password guessing attack

An online password guessing attack cannot succeed since S can choose appropriate trial intervals. On the other hand, in an offline password guessing attack, there must be no verification information for passwords in all exchanges. Observe our proposed scheme, if an adversary obtains all the exchanged messages $(R_1, R_2, h_1, h(\text{username}, \text{realm}, SK_U))$ by passive attack, and wants to guess U 's password, he first

guesses a password PW^* and uses it to compute $R'_1 = h(\text{username}||PW^*)^{-1} R_1 = r_1 P$. By using R'_1 and R_2 , the adversary will try to compute the session key $SK = SK_U = SK_S = r_1 r_2 P$. However, adversary has to break the ECCDHP or ECDDHP to find the keying material $SK = r_1 r_2 P$ from $R'_1 = r_1 P$ and $R_2 = r_2 P$ to verify his/her guess. But, the adversary cannot gain the session key without r_1 of $r_1 P$ and r_2 of $r_2 P$. Therefore, our proposed scheme can resist password guessing attack.

C. Modification attack

An adversary may modify the communication messages $(R_1, R_2, h_1, h(\text{username}||\text{realm}||SK_U))$ being transmitted over an insecure network. However, although adversary forges them, our proposed scheme can detect this modification attack, because it can verify not only the equality of the session key $SK = SK_U = SK_S = r_1 r_2 P$ computed by each party, but also the correctness of R_1 and R_2 transmitted between two parties by validating the message authentication code $h_1 = h(SK_S || R_2)$, $h(\text{username}||\text{realm}||SK_U)$ in the proposed scheme. Therefore, our proposed scheme can resist the modification attack.

D. Stolen-verifier attack

Servers are always the prime target of attacks. An adversary may acquire $VPW = HPW \oplus HK_S$ stored in S . However, without knowing K_S , adversary cannot forge a login request to pass the authentication, as HPW is hidden in $VPW = HPW \oplus HK_S$ by using server's secret key K_S . Thus, the correctness of the guessed password HPW^* cannot be verified by checking $HPW^* = HPW$. Therefore, our proposed scheme can resist stolen-verifier attack.

E. Server spoofing attack

Since our proposed scheme provides mutual authentication, the server spoofing attack can be resisted. In the authentication phase, as U sends REQUEST (username, R_1) to the adversary masquerading as the server, the adversary cannot generate proper (R_2, h_1) without knowing K_S in Step 2 of the authentication phase. Therefore, the server spoofing attack doesn't work in our proposed scheme.

F. Session key security

The session key $SK = SK_U = SK_S = r_1 r_2 P$ is only known to U and S . The random values r_1 and r_2 is protected by the ECDLP and ECDDHP and the secure one-way hash function. Therefore, our proposed scheme provides session key security.

G. Known-key secrecy

Although, an adversary obtains the fresh session key $SK = SK_U = SK_S = r_1 r_2 P$, he/she cannot obtain the U 's secret password PW from $R_1 = (h(\text{username}||PW).r_1)P$

because he/she will face ECDLP to obtain r_1 from $r_1 P$. If the adversary obtains $r_1 P$, then he/she can guess PW from $R_1 = (h(\text{username}||PW).r_1)P$ by computing $R'_1 = (h(\text{username}||PW)^{-1}.h(\text{username}||PW).r_1)P = R_1$. However, it is infeasible because U never sends the $r_1 P$ in the plaintext form over the open network. It is always encrypted by using the secret password PW such as $R_1 = (h(\text{username}||PW).r_1)P$. Therefore, our proposed authentication scheme provides the feature of known key secrecy.

H. Perfect forward secrecy

Perfect forward secrecy is provided in the situation that even though U 's secret password PW or S 's secret key K_S is compromised; an adversary still cannot obtain any previous session keys. In our proposed authentication scheme, an adversary is still faced with the hardness of ECDLP and ECDDHP to compute the session key $SK = SK_U = SK_S = r_1 r_2 P$ from the two extracted values $r_1 P$ and $r_2 P$. Therefore, our proposed authentication scheme can provide the property of perfect forward secrecy. The security properties of previous related schemes [8], [11] and the proposed authentication scheme are summarized in Table 2.

VII. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

The computational costs of our proposed authentication scheme and the previous related schemes [8], [11] are summarized in Table 3. Since, our proposed authentication scheme is based on the elliptic curve cryptosystem [20], the total overhead for communication and performance can be reduced. For example, to reach a reasonable security level, it

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF SECURITY PROPERTIES

	Yang et al's Scheme	Tsai's Scheme	Proposed Scheme
Replay attack	Secure	Secure	Secure
Password guessing attack	Secure	Insecure	Secure
Modification attack	Secure	Secure	Secure
Stolen-verifier attack	Insecure	Insecure	Secure
Mutual Authentication	Provided	Provided	Provided
Session key security	N/A	Provided	Provided
Known key secrecy	N/A	Not Provided	Provided
Perfect forward secrecy	N/A	Not Provided	Provided

TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL COST

	Yang et al's Scheme	Tsai's Scheme	Proposed Scheme
No. of Exponentiation	4	0	0
No. of ECC Computation	0	0	5
No. of hash function	8	7	8
No. of exclusive OR	4	3	2
Security	DLP	Hash	ECDLP

just requires a 160-bit prime p to construct the elliptic curve group $E(F_p)$.

The proposed authentication scheme requires five ECC multiplications, eight hashing and two XOR operations during the protocol. These five ECC computations are needed to provide known-key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy. The cost of inversion operation in Z_q^* is negligible. When considering Tsai's scheme, our proposed authentication scheme is though computationally a little intensive, but offer enhanced security. However, effects of computational intensity can easily be mitigated by the use of powerful processors.

VIII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have shown that Tsai's authentication scheme for session initiation protocol is vulnerable to password guessing attack and stolen verifier attack. Furthermore, it does not provide known-key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy. In order to resolve these security problems, we have proposed a novel and secure mutual authentication scheme based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem for session initiation protocol. The proposed authentication scheme not only resists these attacks but also provides greater security and efficiency. Hence, our proposed authentication scheme can be executed faster than any other previously proposed related schemes.

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